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This four-part study is a critical analysis of several reports dealing with the reform of the
financial system in the United States. The study uses Minsky’s framework of analysis and
focuses on the implications of Ponzi finance for regulatory and supervisory policies. The
main conclusion of the study is that, while all reports make some valuable suggestions,
they fail to deal with the socioeconomic dynamics that emerge during long periods of
economic stability. As a consequence, it is highly doubtful that the principal suggestions
contained in the reports will provide any applicable means to limit the worsening of
financial fragility over periods of economic stability. The study also concludes that any
meaningful systemic and prudential regulatory changes should focus on the analysis of
expected and actual cash flows (sources and stability) rather than capital equity, and on
preventing the emergence of Ponzi processes. The latter tend to emerge over long periods
of economic stability and are not necessarily engineered by crooks. On the contrary, the
pursuit of economic growth may involve the extensive use of Ponzi financial processes in
legal economic activities. The study argues that some Ponzi processes—more precisely,
pyramid Ponzi processes—should not be allowed to proceed, no matter how severe the
immediate impact on economic growth, standards of living, or competitiveness. This is so
because pyramid Ponzi processes always collapse, regardless how efficient financial
markets are, how well informed and well behaved individuals are, or whether there is a
“bubble” or not. The longer the process is allowed to proceed, the more destructive it
becomes. Pyramid Ponzi processes cannot be risk-managed or buffered against; if
economic growth is to be based on a solid financial foundation, these processes cannot be
allowed to continue. Finally, a supervisory and regulatory process focused on detecting
Ponzi processes would be much more flexible and adaptive, since it would not be
preoccupied with either functional or product limits, or with arbitrary ratios of
“prudence.” Rather, it would oversee all financial institutions and all products, no matter
how new or marginal they might be.
See also, Working Paper Nos. 574.2, 574.3, and 574.4.
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KEY CONCEPTS 
• Cash flow: Movement of a monetary instrument in or out of an economic entity. Cash inflows 
and outflows are induced by asset operations and from portfolio operations (selling/buying 
assets, financing and funding of assets). A positive net cash flow (net of all cash payments) 
increases cash reserves, whereas a negative net cash flow decreases cash reserves.  
• Cash-flow mismatch: A difference between the pattern of cash inflows from operational assets 
and the pattern of cash outflows from liabilities, both in terms of timing and level. Usually this 
concept is used to mean that, at a given time, cash outflows are of a larger size than cash 
inflows, thus position-making operations are expected to be needed. 
• Financial Instability Hypothesis: The idea that over periods of enduring economic expansion 
that only record a few small recessions, more and more economic units are involved, 
voluntarily or not, in Ponzi finance. Balance sheets become more sensitive to the non-
realization of expected cash inflows, changes in interest rates, changes in taxes, changes in 
asset prices and other factors that affect cash flows and funding methods.  
• Hedge finance: A financial position that is expected to be strong enough not to require the use 
of position-making operations. This is so either because net cash flows from operations (i.e. 
cash inflows from core activity less cash outflows from the latter) are expected to be large 
enough to meet debt commitments and/or because (unencumbered) cash reserves are large. 
Ultimately, however, the cash-flow criterion is what defines a hedge process because, if it does 
not hold, cash reserves are depleted rapidly. If position-making operations are unexpectedly 
needed, channels to do so are solid and highly liquid. Hedge finance can be subject to fraud, 
excessive optimism in the valuation of net cash flows from operation, and shrinking margins of 
safety (which makes it more prone to become speculative or Ponzi).  
• Liability: Any commitment to make a payment at a specific time in the future (dated liability), 
if an event occurs (contingent liability), or at the demand of creditors (demand liability). 
Payment can be made in cash or any other means that creditors and debtors see fit. Liabilities 
can be on- or off-balance sheet. 
• Margins of safety: Buffers that allow an economic unit to protect itself against expected and 
unexpected adverse events, and to prevent or limit position-making operations. These buffers 
take the form of net worth, the difference between expected cash inflows from operations and   4
debt commitments, cash reserves, and liquid securities. The smaller a margin of safety, the 
higher is the risk that unexpected position-making operations will be needed.  
• Maturity mismatch: A difference between the maturity of the liability side, and the maturity of 
the asset side of the balance sheet. The monetary value of assets declines at a greater or lower 
rate than the monetary value of liabilities. Usually this concept is used to say that assets are 
funded with liabilities of a shorter term, and that when the latter come due, equity capital is not 
as high as the value of assets. In this case, assets are still on the book but liabilities are 
disappearing; therefore, there is a funding problem that requires position-making operations. 
• Operational assets: Assets that represent the core economic activity of an entity. They are the 
main source of cash inflows and are the main determinant of the solvency of an economic unit. 
These assets may be an off-balance sheet item, for example, individuals’ main operational asset 
is their labor power. These assets may be used to generate income (profit) or may be used in 
strategic portfolio operations (capital gains). 
• Ponzi finance: A financial position that is expected to require a growing use of position-
making operations. Position-making channels and cash reserves may be strong at the beginning 
but they weaken rapidly and ultimately rely on exotic and unreliable channels.  
• Position making: Portfolio transactions (buying/selling assets, borrowing/lending) induced by 
the existence of an excess or a shortage of cash relative to the needs of an economic unit. 
Minsky especially focused on situation of shortage of cash (i.e. “defensive/forced” position-
making operations), in which case, position making is the act of meeting financial 
commitments with the help of other economic entities (usually the financial sector). This help 
comes either from borrowing operations (refinancing) and/or from selling assets (liquidation) 
in financial markets or to creditors. Position making occurs when internal sources of cash have 
been exhausted, i.e., net cash inflows from business operations are too low relative to debt 
commitments and cash reserves have been drained, which leads to the need to acquire more 
cash. The safest position-making sources are central-bank refinancing channels, long-term 
contractual credit lines, and unencumbered highly liquid assets (cash reserves are not part of 
this because position making is concerned with meeting debt commitments with the help of an 
external agent, i.e. once cash reserves have been exhausted). The most unreliable position-
making sources are illiquid encumbered assets and short-term contingent credit lines.    5
• Pre-loss creditworthiness: Probable capacity to repay based only on the net cash inflow from 
business operations and the liquidation of highly liquid unencumbered assets (cash reserves 
and markets in which the Federal Reserve act as a specialist in normal times); i.e., excluding 
liquidation of collateralized asset and access to public or private refinancing sources. Rather 
than determining the probability that lenders will be able to recover their stake by any means, 
pre-loss creditworthiness measures the capacity of the borrowers to meet payments from his 
going concern.  
• Speculative finance: A financial position that is expected to require a rolling-over of 
outstanding debt or liquidation of assets at a given price. Position-making channels depend on 
external funding with medium-term credit lines and on less liquid assets.   6
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, the regulatory financial framework has been organized in order to detect frauds 
and “imprudent” risk management, and to make sure that economic incentives are set “properly” 
to promote smooth economic growth. The current financial crisis has shown one more time that 
this type of framework is not appropriate.  
As the severity of the financial crisis deepened, several reports have been published to 
provide some advice to reform the financial system. All the reports note that a reform is 
necessary in order to account for systemic risk and to improve risk management. Unfortunately, 
most of those reports are based on a framework of analysis that is not able to account for 
systemic risk other than through the traditional market/incentive approach that has been the 
backbone of regulation for the past 30 years. In this framework, systemic risk emerges from 
market imperfections (asymmetry of information, mispricing, etc.) or individuals’ 
imperfections/biases (irrationality, bounded rationality, greed, etc.), which, while having some 
merit, limits dramatically the scope of analysis and policy recommendations.  
Minsky has provided us with a framework that tackles systemic issues in a very precise 
and comprehensive way. Over his entire academic career, he developed an explanation of the 
emergence and rise of systemic risk that is not based on market structures, imperfections, and 
improper incentives. He did so by focusing his analysis on the notion of position-making 
operations and on what he called the financial instability hypothesis. This led him to argue that 
the regulatory framework should be organized in such a way that Ponzi financial practices can be 
quickly detected, discouraged and, if necessary, forbidden. The current willingness to improve 
risk management and market incentives is not enough, even if they can be refined to account for 
systemic risk over the whole business cycle. Indeed, this approach is both too permissive and too 
rigid to account for continuous changes in financial practices and for the market dynamics at 
play. We need a financial regulation not based on institutions, functions, or products, but one 
based on financial practices. This regulation should be comprehensive and highly adaptable, and 
should not be based on the criterion of size or government-insurance.  
In order for the reader to understand the point of view from which this report is written, 
one may be reminded that, for Minsky, the main sources of financial instability are internal 
forces of the capitalist economic system that progressively increase financial fragility (Tymoigne 
2009a, 2010). In order to conceptualize the degree of financial fragility, Minsky created three   7
categories that characterize a specific financial state: hedge finance, speculative finance, and 
Ponzi finance. Each of these categories is expected to require more or less defensive position-
making operations, i.e. refinancing and asset liquidation. According to Minsky’s financial 
instability hypothesis, over enduring economic expansions, there are forces in the economic 
system that push more and more economic units away from hedge finance and toward Ponzi 
finance. This growing use of Ponzi finance results from deliberate choices and from forces 
beyond economic agents’ control that unexpectedly transform their financial position, from 
hedge and speculative, into Ponzi.  
In a hedge finance process, it is not expected that position-making operations will be 
needed to meet financial commitments, i.e., all debt commitments are expected to be met by the 
net cash flows from business operations and, if necessary, cash reserves. Thus, hedge finance is a 
very strong financial position because there is no expected dependence on creditors to meet 
financial commitments due to creditors. In addition, if position making is unexpectedly needed, it 
can be done smoothly at low or no cost. The main potential sources of problems are at the 
operational level with an unexpected lack of revenue and/or rise of costs of operation. However, 
hedge finance can still be a source of systemic risk if optimism becomes too strong and inflates 
too much expected cash inflows from business operations, and if margins of safety are small. 
This has a higher chance to occur during a long period of economic expansion that only records 
small recessions. 
In a speculative finance process, it is expected that position-making operations will be 
needed to meet capital servicing (i.e. to repay outstanding debts); however, income servicing 
(interest, dividend, etc.) are expected to be met by the net cash flows from business operations 
and, if necessary, cash reserves. Thus, position-making operations are expected to be stable in 
relation to a given amount of outstanding debts. An alternative name for speculative finance is 
rollover finance. It is “speculative” in the sense that there is an expectation that an access to 
position-making channels will be available when needed. 
The central concept that defines financial fragility is Ponzi finance, which is an extreme 
version of speculative finance. It means that the servicing of a given amount of outstanding debts 
requires a growing amount of refinancing operations and/or asset liquidation at rising prices; 
both income and capital servicing on outstanding debts are expected to be met by position-
making operations. A Ponzi process is an unsustainable financial process. Indeed, in order to   8
persist it requires an exponential growth
1 of financial participation, which is not possible because, 
ultimately, there is a limited number of economic agents that can participate either physically or 
financially. This unsustainability is all the more true in that Ponzi finance creates a strong 
pressure to perform because creditors must be paid (to avoid legal, reputational, and financial 
costs), which gives the incentive to take more risk and to be involved in fraud. In addition, Ponzi 
processes may not be masterminded by a single individual, or a small group of individuals, but 
may be sustained (and approved) by the whole society. In any case, those already in the Ponzi 
process have an incentive to picture a good view of the future to entice others to join the process. 
This is reinforced by the great returns that the Ponzi scheme may have provided in the past, 
which, combined with competitive pressures and social pressures, gives additional incentives to 
join. 
Some forms of Ponzi finance are more dangerous than other forms, which depends on the 
way the economic units involved in it plan to get out of it. The most dangerous of all Ponzi 
finance processes are those for which liquidation and/or unlimited growth of refinancing are 
necessary for the process to continue (pyramid schemes); there is no way to terminate the 
process besides collapse or widespread restructuring of financial commitments. Examples of 
those processes are the mortgage practices of the 2000s, consumer finance practices of the past 
two decades, and the Madoff scandal. The least dangerous Ponzi finance practices involve the 
temporary use of growing refinancing before net cash flows from an assets operation are 
expected to become large enough; this usually implies that the economic units involved in the 
Ponzi process have some market power. For example, the construction of investment goods takes 
time and must be financed; however they do not generate any cash inflows (for producer and 
acquirer) until they are finished and installed in the production process. Thus, a producer’s (and 
his creditors’) profitability depends on the capacity to sell the finished product at a high enough 
price. The buyer’s profitability depends on generating, from the use of the investment good, 
revenues large enough to meet payments on the portion (if any) of the investment purchase that 
has been externally funded, which requires some pricing power on the output generated.  
From the point of view of systemic stability, however, both types of Ponzi finance 
(pyramid/structural or production/temporary) are a source of concern because, as long as they 
                                                 
1  The rate of growth of cash inflows of a Ponzi process must be at least as high as the sum of the 
redemption rate and income-servicing rate of the financial scheme.   9
exist, the economy is potentially subject to a debt-deflation process. It is thus important to forbid 
pyramid processes, and to discourage, as much as possible, the Ponzi financing of economic 
activities. In addition, production Ponzi processes, even though “respectable” (Minsky 1991: 16), 
become highly dangerous when they sustain a pyramid process. In this case, the buyers of new 
capital assets borrow extensively to acquire the latter, and, independently of their motive 
(speculation or operation), plan ultimately to meet debt services through growing refinancing 
and/or by selling the capital assets at a higher price. The housing boom of the past decade is a 
good illustration of a case for which the two types of Ponzi finance were interconnected (Wray 
2007; Kregel 2008; Tymoigne 2010). 
Ponzi finance is different from speculation and is not generated necessarily by greed or 
fraud. Speculation is defined as taking an asset position with the expectation of making a capital 
gain from selling the asset. In a speculative deal, liquidation is a means to make a monetary gain, 
whereas, in a Ponzi process, liquidation is a means to service financial commitments, without 
necessarily involving making a gain from liquidation. In fact, people involved in a Ponzi process 
may hope that they will never have to liquidate their position (at least in net terms) because this 
would lead to a collapse of the process. Speculation with borrowed money is a form of Ponzi 
finance; however, the latter occurs in speculative and non-speculative activities. For example, the 
recent mortgage boom was sustained by a Ponzi process that involved individuals who truly 
wished to stay in their homes (Tymoigne 2009b, 2010). In addition, Ponzi finance may not be 
entered by choice but may be forced on individuals by rising interest rates, rising cost of 
operations, unexpected large decline in after-tax revenues, and other unexpected factors affecting 
cash inflows and cash outflows. Thus, initially, an economic unit may have hedge financed its 
asset position but, overtime, may be dragged unexpectedly into speculative and then Ponzi 
finance. Finally, Ponzi finance is also different from fraudulent behaviors because some 
individuals may enter Ponzi processes while playing by the rules of law and following the norms 
of behaviors established by society. Thus, everybody may behave “wisely” or “properly” but still 
may contribute a great deal to a rising financial fragility.  
In order to detect Ponzi financial processes, several things should be analyzed. Most 
important of all is the analysis of cash inflows and cash outflows induced by assets and liabilities 
(both on- and off-balance sheet), and the determination of the position-making needs and 
practices. Once this is done, supervisors should focus their attention on detecting the sensitivity   10
of balance sheets to declines in asset prices and to the unavailability of expected refinancing 
channels. Theoretically, this can be done for a single financial institution, a specific sector of the 
financial sector, the entire financial sector, or the whole economy. For the moment, this has been 
mainly restricted (in a limited way) to individual financial institutions in order to detect 
fraudulent activities, but a macroeconomic perspective would be very helpful to catch legal 
Ponzi practices. In terms of balance sheet, a Ponzi process usually implies high maturity 
mismatch, high leverage, and the use of exotic refinancing sources, but this state of affairs can be 
hidden by complex “creative” accounting practices and by the fact that it is relatively recent. In 
addition, the central characteristic of Ponzi processes is that there is a cash-flow mismatch (even 
if asset and liability maturities are matched). 
In terms of policy, Minsky advocates regulations that strongly discourage, if not forbid, 
Ponzi finance and that promote hedge finance. Minsky, however, is aware that financial 
institutions make money on the expectation that refinancing channels will be available. As a 
consequence, speculative finance should be authorized but everything should be done to avoid a 
transformation of speculative finance into Ponzi finance. This, more than bubbles or frauds, 
should be a central concern for regulatory authorities because of the financial instability 
hypothesis. It is during smooth economic times that dangerous financial practices grow rapidly, 
even if everybody acknowledges that there is no bubble or fraud. Thus, regulatory and 
supervisory authorities must be especially careful and vigilant when everybody else is concerned 
with improving market shares and potential economic growth as much as possible.    11
MAIN POINTS OF THE ASSESSMENT 
   Ponzi Finance and Financial Fragility 
o  We need a proactive framework built around the core concepts of (defensive) 
position-making operations and financial instability hypothesis. 
o  Ponzi processes: 
  Do not necessarily involve fraudulent activities and may be generated by the 
overall society rather than by a specific individual. 
  Can be sustained by numerous small economic entities rather than a few large 
companies. 
  Take more less dangerous forms: Pyramid/structural vs. production/temporary. 
o  The discovery of actual and potential Ponzi processes and of the growth of financial 
fragility (erosion of hedge and speculative financial positions) should be the core 
preoccupation of systemic and prudential regulation and supervision. This implies 
analyzing: 
  The strength of hedge and speculative financial position: Analyze the 
sensitivity of those positions to adverse changes in expectations, the non-
realization of expected cash inflows, changes in interest rates, and other 
elements that affect cash inflows and cash outflows. 
  The nature of existing Ponzi processes: production vs. pyramid, size, and the 
potential relation between the two forms of Ponzi finance. 
  The needs for position-making operations and the strength of the channels for 
doing so. 
o  Ponzi processes are intrinsically unstable because they require an exponential growth 
of financial participation in order to be sustained. The longer they continue the more 
destructive they become if they collapse, because they involve a larger number of 
participants and larger sums of money. 
o  Efficient market pricing, and well-informed and highly sophisticated financial 
investors cannot prevent the collapse of a Ponzi process. It is not a question of 
efficiency or sophistication, but one of exponential growth process.   12
o  Ponzi process usually implies a high maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities, 
and a high leverage ratio. But those two criteria are not sufficient to determine the 
existence of a Ponzi process because: 
  Creative accounting can hide mismatch and true leverage. 
  Even if there is a high maturity mismatch and a high leverage, cash flows may 
still be matched. 
  What is crucial is the size of expected cash inflows from business operation 
relative to the size of cash outflows from liabilities, i.e. the expected 
dependence on position-making activities to meet financial commitments. 
  A low reserve of cash is also an indicator of a Ponzi process but only a 
secondary criterion (and only in comparison to debt commitments). Indeed, an 
economic unit engaged in a Ponzi process might have a large amount of cash 
reserves at a point in time, but the process will deplete them very fast. 
o  An unsustainable financial practice is not determined by a reference to a fair value 
(“bubble”) or a balance sheet ratio (“high” leverage). An unsustainable financial 
practice is one that relies on a Ponzi process. “Bubble” and “high” leverage are too 
loose concepts to provide a reliable means to regulate financial institutions and they 
weaken the power of persuasion and justification of regulators and supervisors. 
 
   Systemic Relevance, Moral Hazard  
o  A financial institution is systematically relevant if it promotes Ponzi financing. It 
does not matter how big it is, how new it is, or if it is government insured or not. 
o  No financial institution should be unregulated. Ponzi processes have a greater chance 
to emerge first in unregulated parts of the financial sector because they are easier to 
start there.  
o  Moral hazard emerging from government insurance should not be the main concern 
of financial regulators and supervisors. As stated above, unregulated, and so non-
government-insured, financial companies are not prone to the previous moral hazard 
problem but still matter because they are Ponzi prone. The latter is the main source of 
emergence of systemic moral hazard and fraud.    13
o  “Systemic moral hazard” rather than idiosyncratic moral hazard is of greater concern. 
That is, a government that provides buffers that stabilize the economic system, 
whatever the nature of those buffers and their cost to the private sector, encourage an 
increase in risk taking and creative financial practices. 
o  Rather than a “bad-bank” approach to regulation, we need a “Ponzi-finance” 
approach to regulation both at the prudential and systemic levels of regulation. This 
does not mean that there is no place for the discovery of lenient behaviors (i.e. fraud 
and over-optimism). Indeed, hedge financing (and Ponzi financing, of course) can be 
based on fraudulent or over-optimist expectations about cash inflows. 
 
   Risk Management 
o  The risk-management approach is a very permissive approach that allows financial 
institutions to justify and to rationalize all sorts of financial practices as long as they 
can be buffered “prudently.” 
o  The risk-management approach is also too rigid to account for changes in financial 
practices to evade “prudent” risk management practices. 
o  Excessive risk taking cannot be prudently managed, no matter how large the buffer is 
in terms of capital or liquidity ratios. 
o  Setting regulatory “normal” leverage ratios, or other “normal” ratios creates several 
problems: 
  The period of time during which regulators and supervisors should be the 
most concerned is when everything is normal, i.e., leverage ratios are low 
(relative to the norm), liquidity ratio is high, etc. Indeed, it is during normal 
times that Ponzi processes emerge as confidence rises and margins of safety 
shrink, and so it is during those times that supervisors should be especially 
careful and thorough in their investigations.  
  As long as financial institutions meet the normal regulatory ratios, it is 
assumed by regulators that those financial institutions are well protected, safe, 
etc. The problem is that this may cover unsustainable financial practices. 
Normal ratios give a false sense of safety and completely miss the underlying 
evolution of financial practices. Thus, what matters is not how well companies   14
are doing in relation to a “normal” balance sheet ratio, nor how asset prices 
are growing in relationship to a norm or a trend (i.e. existence of a bubble or 
not). What matters are the financial practices that sustain a given asset-price 
growth pattern or leverage ratio pattern. Everybody may agree that there is no 
bubble or that companies are not highly leveraged but this may be sustained 
by unsustainable financial practices. 
  Setting too stringent criteria for “normalcy” may constrain economic growth 
potential. Especially if the “normalcy” of those criteria is set right after a big 
financial debacle. 
  What is considered normal changes over time, with changes in confidence and 
economic results. There will be strong political pressures, from the financial 
community and the public, to loosen criteria of normalcy or to be more lax, 
because the pursuit of economic growth may require a loosening of 
underwriting criteria. This is especially so if the economic system has been 
relatively stable for decades (like the 1950s and 1960s) and if competitive 
pressures are strong. 
o  The leverage ratio, or debt-to-income ratio, may not be an appropriate measure of 
Ponzi finance because cash flows may be matched. A cash-flow analysis is essential 
to discover actual and potential Ponzi processes and to capture the growth of financial 
instability. Thus, an effective systemic approach to financial regulation and 
supervision should emphasize the analysis of cash flows and position-making 
channels: 
  Analyze expected cash inflows and cash outflows generated by items on- and 
off-balance sheet. Distinguish between operational and exceptional cash flows 
and emphasize operational cash flows. 
  Analyze the strength of, and need for, refinancing and liquidation channels if a 
net cash outflow is expected. Do the analysis under different economic 
conditions (recession, stagnation, growth), without assuming that any of these 
conditions is the normal state of the economy.   15
  This analysis should be done at the firm, sectorial, and macroeconomic levels. 
The latter would require significant developments in macroeconomic 
accounting. 
  The discovery of actual and potential Ponzi processes and of the erosion of 
strong financial positions are the main goal, which implies discovering the 
expected and actual position-making needs of financial institutions as well as 
assessing the strength of position-making channels. 
o  Regulation should be highly proactive in risk management by forbidding some 
financial practices that lead to excessive risk taking (excessive being defined as Ponzi 
process). 
 
   Asset Valuation and Solvency Issues 
o  Capital is not a measure of the financial strength and health of a company. 
  Capital is a measure of the buffer available to senior creditors in case of 
financial problems (i.e. when a company is financially unhealthy). It is a 
measure of the buffer available before losses of market value (or writedowns) 
prevents senior creditors from recovering their financial stake. 
  A high capital equity may be backed by highly illiquid assets, which does not 
allow a company to meet large demand or contingent debt commitments that 
may come due, even if the company is highly profitable. 
  A high capital equity may help to find funding sources in the preceding case 
(liquidity crisis), but there is no guarantee that this will be the case. 
  Profit is not a measure of the capacity to generate cash flows: profit can grow 
even though net cash inflow does not grow. Profit is a measure of the 
difference between the change in the monetary value of assets and the change 
in the monetary value of liabilities, independently of the sources of the 
changes. For example: 
•  Distressed institutions can “increase their reported earnings by 
marking to market of certain of their own liabilities as the credit risk 
on their debt has increased” (Group of Thirty 2009). 
•  Rising inventory raises profit.   16
•  The accounting depreciation of physical assets lowers profit. 
  Cash flow from business operations is the core or “normal” source of funds 
for companies and so is the main source of their financial strength. 
o  High capital equity may or may not prevent moral hazard. 
  Relationship is non-linear because a high level of equity may give the 
confidence to take excessive risk. 
  Management and shareholders usually have different objectives. 
  With the emergence of credit default swaps (CDS) and equity default swaps 
(EDS), shareholders may have an incentive to let a company become insolvent. 
o  Asset valuation should follow a conditional valuation method instead of a mark-to-
market or historical cost method. 
  Solvency is ultimately the expected capacity to generate positive net cash 
flows over the existence of a company, i.e. the capacity of a company to meet 
liability claims on its own (i.e. without recourse to refinancing and 
liquidation). This implies cash-flow matching and maturity matching (as well 
as, as a secondary matter, large cash reserves). 
  Historical cost approach totally ignores the importance of cash-flow analysis. 
  Mark-to-market approach may ignore totally the long-term viability of a 
company and is influenced by all sorts of factors that have nothing to do with 
the capacity of a company to generate a significantly positive net cash flow 
from operations. Thus, a negative net worth may not reflect insolvency. This 
point is all the more important that now CDS and EDS give an incentive to 
financial-market participants to undervalue, and to create artificial problems 
for companies in order to obtain gains from derivative bets. 
  Mark-to-market approach is especially inappropriate for illiquid idiosyncratic 
assets. 
  Conditional approach focuses on determining the expected streams of cash 
inflows and cash outflows under different economic conditions. None of the 
conditions should be judged “normal” but a good understanding of the 
financial position of a company under different scenarios helps to determine   17
its viability. This would require the use of a cash-flow analysis presented 
above. 
 
   Competition, Innovation and Economic Growth 
o  There is too much belief in the almighty benefits of competition, innovation, and 
economic growth 
o  Too high competition promotes sloppy underwriting procedures, sloppy innovations, 
and a process of fuite en avant. The latter means that economic agents only care about 
their own economic survival without any consideration for the indirect and lagged 
feedback implications of their actions on systemic fragility (when the survival of the 
system is required for the survival of economic agents). 
o  Not all financial innovations are worth existing and some of them can threaten the 
competitiveness of financial institutions that created them. This is especially the case 
of Ponzi-prone financial innovations. 
o  The idea that financial inventions should always be given a trial period in the real 
world before they are judged as “good” or “bad” is very different from the way we 
treat inventions in others parts of the economic system. Mechanical inventions and 
drugs, for example, are subject to long trial periods before they are allowed to enter 
the economy, and the criterion to judge if they are “good” is not their profitability 
(this is determined by companies before the trial period through extensive market 
analysis) but the safety of the population. 
o  Economic growth needs to rest on solid financial practices in order to be smooth and 
to contribute to welfare gains. Economic growth just for the stake of economic 
growth, which unfortunately is a major drawback of for-profit enterprises that require 
growth to stay alive, is not good economics. This leads to wasteful spending 
sustaining the continuous creation of new wants, and to dangerous financial practices 
to sustain growth by any means. 
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   Financial Education, Disclosure of Information, and the Responsibilities of Financial 
Companies 
o  Better disclosure of information and better financial education will not help to 
promote financial stability because: 
  Many borrowers are too poorly educated to understand something as “simple” 
as compounding. 
  More information does not imply a better decision-making process: 
•  Psychologists have shown that only confidence is positively related to 
information while the quality of decisions declines after a certain level 
of information is achieved: more information gives a sense of control 
and knowledge that gives an incentive to take more risk. 
•  More than the information itself, it is the interpretation of this 
information that matters. During good economic times, this may imply 
disregarding information that could threaten the continuation of a 
profitable economic practice, or the transformation of bad information 
into good information. 
  Financial investors and borrowers may understand perfectly the financial 
implications of a financial product and may have all the information necessary 
to make a decision; they may also be highly “sophisticated.” This does not 
mean that they will not enter in unsustainable financial practices. They may 
just hope that the “hot potato” will not remain in their hands, or they may truly 
believe that a “long” period of stability means that it is normal and convenient 
to enter Ponzi practices, or the latter may be required for a business (or an 
economic sector) to temporarily prolong its economic survival and 
competitiveness. 
o  It is the responsibility of financial companies to judge the relevance of a financial 
product for a specific customer. This is the way it works in other sectors of the 
economy where professionals (dentist, mechanic, etc.) tell a client what is wrong and 
what they recommend. Financial companies are the financial experts, not the 
customers, so the burden of proof lies on the former to justify the relevance of a   19
financial product to the latter. This implies a thorough analysis of the financial 
strength of a customer in a way presented above. 
o  Most reports note that it is important to improve disclosure of relevant information 
for shareholders and other financial investors. This is problematic for several reason: 
  The information disclosure should also consider systemic stability and 
financial-market participants might not find that useful. 
  The shareholder-center approach to the problem assumes that shareholders are 
concerned with the viability of a company per se, and concerned with viability 
of the economic system (and so of the company). None of those two elements 
needs to be true: 
•  Shareholders may have interests that are in direct opposition with the 
survival of a company as a going concern. The emergence of “empty 
voting” with CDS and EDS is especially a concern here, but more 
broadly, shareholders may impose demands that are in contradiction 
with the long-term viability of a company (sometimes without 
knowing it). 
•  Shareholders (and managers) usually have no patience and concern for 
the systemic implications of their individual decisions; especially if 
they are in the way of lucrative businesses. 
o  Regulators and supervisors should have access to more systemic data and perform 
systemic analysis, and should get a better financial education: 
  We lack the data to do so, no macroeconomic cash-flow accounting, not all 
cash flows are tracked, etc. 
  The training of regulators and supervisors has not kept pace with the creativity 
of the financial sector, and is focused on detecting frauds rather than Ponzi 
processes. 
o  Off-balance sheet accounting was developed to avoid capital requirements. Now that 
it is proposed to include off-balance sheet exposures into the calculation of capital 
requirements, liquidity requirements, and risk management, there is no point in 
having off-balance sheet accounting.   20
o  It is important to make sure that people in the company have a good understanding of 
the risk culture of a company. However, the culture itself should be such that it does 
not promote excessive risk taking and fraud. 
 
   Financial Structure 
o  The size and concentration of the financial sector is of great concern for several 
reasons: 
  An oligopoly creates large financial interrelations among few financial 
institutions, which leads to a rapid spread of financial problems when one 
institution fails. 
  Large and diversified financial institutions are extremely hard, if not 
impossible, to supervise and to regulate properly. This is especially the case 
when they are engaged in many different activities that are inconsistent with 
their core business and culture. 
o  Most reports assume that the current structure of the financial system is a given, but it 
is still possible, and probably will be necessary, to break some of the biggest 
companies. The breaking down should be done to make sure that: 
  The economic activities of the company are consistent with the culture and 
core business of the company. 
  Financial companies are a means to sustain economic growth rather than a 
means to sustain speculative activities. 
  A company can be regulated and supervised properly. 
o  Financial companies should be structured so that their balance sheet has a strong 
cash-flow matching, a good maturity matching, and an adequate amount of liquid 
assets relative to the types of liability they have. That would limit the need to rely on 
position-making operations. 
o  Competition should be alleviated in the financial sector: 
  Like for other sectors of the economy, create a patent system that rewards 
companies that create safe financial products. This will give financial 
companies the time to focus their creativity and entrepreneurship skills toward   21
meeting the needs of customers, and toward creating reliable financial 
products and practices that sustain their competitiveness and economic growth. 
  Compensation of employees should be based on the long-term survival of a 
company as a going concern. If the long-term survival is based on a Ponzi 
process, this is not good. 
 
   Macroeconomic Aspects 
o  Fiscal sustainability is not a matter of concern for governments of countries that are 
monetarily sovereign. A monetarily sovereign government can never be insolvent, it 
can afford all spending necessary. 
o  Rather than focusing on the inflationary aspects of massive “bailouts” and 
government interventions, one should worry about the impact of highly liquid, highly 
deleverage balance sheets once the economic stabilizes and economic growth takes 
off, and once the private sector is focused on achieving the highest economic growth 
possible. High liquidity, combined with a long period of prosperity, progressively 
lead to the emergence of Ponzi processes. 
o  Macroeconomic policies (monetary policy, fiscal policy) should account for the 
financial state of the economy before they are implemented. A permanent willingness 
by the government to reach a fiscal surplus, and a high and highly volatile central 
bank rate, are not conducive to financial stability. Indeed, they reduce the cash 
inflows from business operations and increase cash outflows from debt commitments. 
 
 
   Policy Recommendations 
o  Financial regulation and supervision should not be based on functions or institutions 
but on financial practices, and should aim at discovery and eliminating Ponzi 
processes and frauds induced by specific institutional set ups, market incentives, and 
crooks. Changing financial practices implies changing the structure of financial 
institutions and of the financial system, constraining unsustainable economic growth, 
changing incentives, and chasing thieves.   22
o  Systemic stability should be a main concern of regulation and supervision. This 
concern should override any other concerns from Main Street or Wall Street because 
systemic stability is required for the fulfillment of the goals of the latter two 
economic categories. This macroprudential supervision would require: 
  Developing a cash-flow macroeconomic accounting system. 
  Developing measures of leverage and liquidity that account for both maturity 
mismatch and cash-flow mismatch. 
o  Focus prudential and systemic regulation and supervision on discovering and 
terminating unsustainable financial practices, i.e., Ponzi financial practices 
(fraudulent or not). Those practices should be discouraged (production/temporary 
Ponzi) and eliminated (pyramid/structural Ponzi) even if they are required for the 
maintenance of economic growth processes, and so the profitability of companies and 
the life style of households, because they are highly unstable, and destroy profitability 
and life style when they collapse. 
o  Concerns about Ponzi processes (both at the prudential and systemic levels) should be 
complemented by concerns about the discovery of lenient behaviors because hedge 
financing can be based on fraudulent or over-optimistic expectations about cash 
inflows. 
o  There is a need for a regulatory institution that meets frequently to discuss financial 
issues and developments. Something like the Federal Open Market Committee but 
focused exclusively on financial issues. This institution should regroup all regulators 
as well as members of all sectors of the economy (Main Street and Wall Street).  
  This would allow members of the regulatory system to understand the most 
recent developments in the financial system, which would allow them to 
improve the training of supervisors, to improve the detection of Ponzi 
practices, and to adjust the regulatory framework quickly to avoid regulatory 
arbitrages. 
  This would allow to them have a sense of the current position-making 
practices, and their extent. 
o  To promote smooth economic growth and a competitive financial system, regulators 
should promote hedge finance:   23
  Financial innovations should not be allowed to enter the economy before they 
pass an extensive trial period (performed by an independent government 
agency) that determines: 
•  The patterns of cash flows of financial products. 
•  The type of individuals that could meet the demand of these cash-flow 
patterns on their own, i.e., without refinancing and liquidation of 
encumbered assets and only with the net cash inflows from operation 
or unencumbered cash reserves. The primary criterion is the adequacy 
of net cash inflows from operation. 
  Promote financial products that help to smooth economic activity by 
promoting maturity and cash-flow matching. Regulators may be involved in 
creating financial products and promoting their use via monetary incentives. 
  Create a patent system that rewards safe financial inventions and gives an 
incentive to financial institutions to take the time to create hedge-finance 
products. 
  Once in the economy, financial innovations should be continuously monitored 
to make sure that they are not used in Ponzi processes. If they are, regulators 
and supervisors should correct the problem by: 
•  Forbidding the extension of the financial products to new customers 
that use them in a Ponzi fashion. 
•  Forbidding a financial product altogether if it cannot be used in a safe 
way anymore. 
o  Measures of creditworthiness should be revised by putting the concept of Ponzi 
finance at the center of the measurement: “How will you pay on time?” is the relevant 
question rather than “will you pay on time?” 
  Credit ratings need more than a change in lettering. There needs to be a 
change in the information provided regarding the main way a rating is 
sustained. 
  The analysis of cash flows from operations and cash flows from liabilities is 
essential to determine the creditworthiness of a borrower. A creditworthy 
borrower should be able to meet his debt commitments on his own through net   24
cash inflows from operations or unencumbered highly liquid assets. The 
liquidation of collateralized assets and access to refinancing channels should 
not be a part of the measure of creditworthiness. Doing otherwise will lead to 
a positive feedback between creditworthiness and value of collateral, leading 
to a Ponzi process. 
  Pre-loss capacity to repay is what matters for judging creditworthiness. That 
is, capacity to repay based on expected net cash inflow from operation and 
unencumbered liquid assets only. It asks “can you make the payment on your 
own?” rather than “will lenders be able to recover their stakes?”  
o  Financial education of customers will have only a marginal impact on financial 
stability. At best, it will help to improve consumer protection but only in a marginal 
way. Instead, regulators should improve their own financial education. 
o  Financial companies should be of a size that allows supervisors and regulators to 
analyze them properly. This may require them to not only to break down some of the 
biggest financial institutions, but also to increase the training and number of 
supervisors and regulators. 
  Structure financial institutions so that they have a coherent business model 
that is consistent with their culture. 
  Balance sheets should be set to a good maturity matching, high cash-flow 
matching, adequate cash reserve, and highly liquid unencumbered assets 
(especially if demand liabilities are in high proportion) 
o  Regulatory and supervisory agencies are only as good as the persons involved in them. 
We need to improve the training, staffing and independence (from politicians, Main 
Street, and Wall Street) of financial regulators: 
  Increase funding: provide better pay to attract the best people. 
  Increase education and financial information toward the detection of both 
fraud and Ponzi finance. 
  Senior regulators should be old enough to have their career behind them: no 
incentive to be lenient to be sure to find a job back in the financial sector. 
o  Off-balance sheet accounting should be eliminated. 
  All asset positions and funding methods should be known.   25
  It becomes irrelevant if included in the calculation of capital and liquidity 
requirements.  
  Today, most special purpose entities are set up for arbitrage purpose rather 
than balance-sheet purpose, which promote Ponzi processes. 
o  All financial companies should be regulated for both prudential and systemic 
purposes, independently of size, access to government insurance, or other criterion.   26
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